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Electricity

The global impacts of power reforms
Sharon Beder
Dozens of governments have embarked on the pathway to electricity deregulation and privatisation since the mid-1990s.
It has become the accepted wisdom amongst governments and opinion leaders despite the consequent price rises and
disasters that have followed in its wake: the series of blackouts that have been experienced from Buenos Aires to Auckland;
the government bailouts of electricity companies that have been necessary in California and Britain; the need for electricity rationing in Brazil; and the fact that it has become too expensive for millions of people from India to South Africa.

Electricity deregulation and privatisation is referred to as
‘liberalisation’ by its advocates, who use the term to disguise what is in essence a massive shift of ownership and
control of electricity from public to private hands.
‘Liberalisation’ has seen the goal of an affordable, accessible and reliable service replaced by the market ideal of
competition, the myth of consumer choice, and the priority of economic efficiency, as measured by profits or
rate of return on investment.
The privatisation of electricity is not something that
citizens have demanded or wanted. In general, there has
been very little public participation in electricity reform
decisions and as the consequences are observed, there
have been many bitter protests against electricity privatisation (see Hall et al. in this volume). Popular uprisings
have occurred in Argentina, India, Indonesia and Ghana.
Protests have halted privatisation proposals in Peru,
Ecuador and Paraguay. In the Dominican Republic several people were killed during protests against blackouts
imposed by privatised companies. In South Africa thousands marched during a two-day general strike to protest
privatisation, which they labelled ‘born-again apartheid’.
In Papua New Guinea students were killed when thousands rallied against the planned privatisation of govern-

ment services including Elcom, the electricity authority.
Even in China, workers protested the sale of a power
plant in Henan province to a private company and threatened to “block the state highway and lie on the railroad
while the trains run over us” (O’Neill, 2001:3).
The beneficiaries of privatisation have been the consultants and the banks, building societies, insurance
companies, pension funds and other industrial and commercial companies that were able to invest in the newly
privatised services and/or provide loans to those who do.
They have advised on privatisation schemes and helped
draw up deregulation legislation around the world. They
have collected fees from brokering the purchase of independent power producers world wide and have been
involved in energy trading themselves.

Price manipulation
Electricity restructuring and privatisation is supposed to
introduce competition into electricity provision and
expose the newly privatised electricity firms to the disciplines of the market so that they become more efficient
and electricity prices are reduced. In reality, electricity
prices have risen or at the very least become exceedingly
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volatile as a result of privatisation and restructuring. The
supposed disciplines of the market have been eclipsed by
price manipulation by electricity companies seeking to
boost the price of electricity and maximise profits.
In California the cost of electricity to residents and
businesses increased by USD 11 billion in one year and
billions of dollars were moved from the pockets of
Californian consumers and utilities to energy companies
and electricity brokers, many of them in other states.
Mines, sawmills and aluminium factories were shut
down and workers were laid off (Beder, 2003). A study by
deregulation advocates Paul Joskow, a professor of
Economics and Management at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), and Edward Kahn, of
Analysis Group/Economics in San Francisco, demonstrated that the price hikes could not be explained by
market conditions such as rising natural gas prices,
increased electricity demand, insufficient supply or even
increase in pollution trading credits. They found that the
wholesale electricity prices were far beyond what they
should have been in a truly competitive market (Joskow
and Kahn, 2000).
What happened was that the power suppliers had
started exercising their market-power and manipulating
the price. The main way they were doing this was by
withholding some of their supply to create an artificial
shortage to drive prices up. Generators were simultaneously shutting down generating capacity for maintenance
just when the supply was most needed (Beder, 2003).
Generators and marketers sold electricity out of the state,
and when prices soared in California because of the
shortages they sold it back to California at much higher
prices than they otherwise would have received. In fact,
more electricity was exported from California in 2000
during the supposed shortages than had been exported
the previous year, and there was no regulation to stop
generators doing this because that would interfere with
the free market (Berry and Riccardi, 2001:A-1).
It was not until Enron went bankrupt that documents
came to light which proved that power companies had
been manipulating Californian electricity prices and
deceptively making money off utilities and consumers.
For example, Enron artificially created the impression
that power lines were congested, by overstating the
power it was planning to deliver over them, so it would
be paid to relieve congestion that was not really going to
be there. Congestion payments could be as high as USD
750 per MWh (Oppel, 2002; Oppel and Gerth, 2002).
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Enron was certainly not the only company to employ
such price manipulation strategies. A former energy
trader from Goldman Sachs told the New York Times:
“The whole reason for the existence of traders is to make as
much money as possible, consistent with what’s legal (…) I
lived through this: if you didn’t manipulate the market and
manipulation was accessible to you, that’s when you were
yelled at” (Kahn, 2002). Such price manipulations
enabled private electricity suppliers to drive the wholesale price from USD 30 per MWh before deregulation to
peaks of thousands of dollars per MWh.
California may be the most publicised example of
price manipulation but there are many others in the US.
Since federal deregulation of wholesale electricity prices
in 1996, price spikes of many times the cost of production have occurred in many states. Between 1997 and
1999 average wholesale prices in Chicago, the Upper
Midwest, New York and New England more than doubled whilst they tripled in other parts of the country, particularly the South, and quadrupled in Texas. Even industrial customers, who are best able to shop around for the
best price in the new deregulated markets, have not benefited from price reductions in deregulated states of the
US (Apt, 2005).
States in the US that have not deregulated their electricity have not experienced the same large increases in
rates, as publicly owned utilities have kept rates 10 to 40
percent below neighbouring privately owned utilities.
For example, cities in California where electricity was
publicly owned, such as Los Angeles, were unaffected by
price rises or blackouts because citizens and industries
were not at the mercy of private suppliers. Nationwide,
the residential rates charged by publicly owned utilities
are still some 10 percent less on average than those
charged by private utilities and the commercial rates are
7 percent less (Goozner, 2001; APPA, 2005).
Price manipulation has also been a feature of the
Australian electricity market. Generators supplying the
National Electricity Market (NEM) are able to withhold
capacity on hot days until the price peaks and then they
can rebid their capacity at inflated prices. This means
that prices can vary from AUD 30 to AUD 10,000 per
MWh. Generators admit that the reason for rebidding is
‘financial optimisation’ – i.e. making money. Until 2001
electricity prices to households did not suffer much
‘mainly through tight government controls’. These were
progressively removed after that date as retail markets
were opened to competition and the pain of skyrocketing

largest foreign investment in India. The Power Purchase
Agreement committed the electricity board to pay for
electricity at a set rate without committing Enron to provide that electricity. Additionally 90 percent of the plant’s
generating capacity was to be paid for, night and day,
whether or not it was needed or cheaper supplies were
available. Despite the high prices, the risks were all borne
by the Indian central and state governments rather than
the investors. The agreement required the power to be
paid for in US dollars, highly unusual in India, so that the
risk of a currency devaluation was borne totally by the
state. The price of electricity was also tied to the world
price of oil, which escalated after 1999. The less electricity that the state bought, the higher the unit price. Locals
protested the environmental and social impacts of the
project, whose electricity was both unreliable and heavily polluting. Although the power supplied by the plant
was supposed to help regional economic growth, the cost
of the power threatened to become a severe burden on
the very industries it was supposed to help. It was even
more of a burden on poor consumers and farmers who
had become accustomed to cheap, subsidised electricity.
By the end of 2000, the electricity board was buying
power from Dabhol at 8 rupees per unit and selling it to
consumers at 2 rupees. (For further details on the Dabhol
project see the chapter by Prayas Energy Group on power
reforms in India later in this volume.)
Even World Bank analysts admit that Independent
Power Producers (IPPs) like Enron have often inflated
supply prices for utilities around the world. In the
Philippines, for example, the price of power from the
IPPs, even before the Asian crisis in 1996, was USD 76
per MWh compared with USD 57 for state-owned
Napocor’s power (Albouy and Bousba, 1998). Electricity
prices for consumers in the Philippines are now the highest in the ASEAN Region.
In most countries around the world where electricity
has been privatised or deregulated, retail electricity
prices have increased, often dramatically for households
and small businesses. In the rare case where wholesale
prices declined, it was usually as a result of external cost
reductions, particularly in the cost of fuel, as in the
United Kingdom during the nineties. Had the government-owned system remained in place in the UK consumers and/or taxpayers would have reaped the benefits.
However in an unregulated private system, savings from
lower fuel costs were mostly retained by the private electricity companies. Most recently, electricity prices have
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rates began to be felt (Sexton, 2001; Business Review
Weekly, 2001; James, 2001; Wilson, 2001). A study by the
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics (ABARE), a supporter of deregulation and
competition in electricity markets, has confirmed this
price manipulation. Such uncompetitive bidding has cost
the Australian economy hundreds of millions of dollars
(ABARE, 2002).
Prices were initially manipulated by withholding
actual generating capacity, then generators moved to economic withholding in 2000, bidding large chunks of their
capacity at very high prices. This practice began in
Victoria and spread to more companies and other states
in 2001. Consulting firm Bardak Ventures conducted a
study that concluded that, “the major factor contributing
to the price spike is the bidding and rebidding practices of
the generators” (ACCC, 2002:77-78). It is no accident that
South Australia and Victoria, the only states to have fully
privatised their electricity supplies, have the highest residential prices of all the eastern states. Because of continued state ownership, average electricity prices in New
South Wales have fallen over the last ten years in contrast
to rising prices in Victoria and South Australia. Business
prices have decreased by 22 percent and household prices
by 11 percent. The South Australia regulator claimed that
more than 20 percent of the electricity price to consumers in the state resulted from privatisation (Plane,
2003).
A similar trend could be observed in South America.
During the nineties Brazil’s electricity system was purchased by a complicated web of foreign private investors.
The retail and distribution sections of the system were
privatised first. Light Serviços de Electricidade (Light)
was auctioned in 1996 and purchased by a consortium
comprised of EdF of France, AES of the US and CSN of
Brazil. The terms of the contract meant that Light would
buy hydroelectric electricity from the state at USD 23 per
MWh and sell it to consumers for USD 120, compared
with USD 75 that EdF charged the more affluent French
electricity consumers. Consumers experienced massive
price rises while the foreign owners repatriated profits
and avoided investing in new generating capacity
(McKee, 1996; Benjamin, 2001; Costa, 2001).
When India was being pressured to privatise its electricity by the IMF and the World Bank in the early 1990s,
Enron used its political influence with US embassies and
the CIA to win a USD 3 billion contract to build the
Dabhol Power Plant south of Bombay. This was the

been rising dramatically in Britain (OFGEM, 2005).
Price volatility and manipulation are an inevitable
function of electricity markets, whatever their design. In
a market, there is no central planner choosing which
plants to call on according to logic and marginal costs.
Instead “the central planner is replaced by price signals”
(Quiggin, 2001:7). The owners of a plant that is sitting
idle most of the day require the price they get at peak
time to compensate for the periods of idle time. So even
in a competitive market prices go up and down. This
price fluctuation is exacerbated by the ease with which
private companies can use their market power, or create
artificial shortages of electricity, to force the price up to
very high levels, even in times of lower demand.
Electricity markets bring a disjuncture between price and
the cost of production.

Investment in infrastructure
Privatisation of electricity services is supposed to raise
revenue for governments, provide new sources of investment capital for expensive electricity infrastructure and
reduce the role of government in the economy.
Planning and long-term forecasting of demand, as
well as the upgrading of worn-out infrastructure, used to
be an essential part of providing a reliable public electricity service. The need for long-term planning and coordination were major reasons why governments took control of electricity in many countries around the world in
the first half of the nineteenth century. But in the eighties the need for planning and maintenance began to take
second place to the desire to commercialise electricity
services. And in the nineties, when electricity was liberalised, privatised and deregulated around the world, the
planning function of government bureaucracies was
abandoned altogether and surrendered to market forces.
In replacing government planning, market forces are
supposed to ensure there is enough supply because the
market is assumed to have the ability to balance supply
and demand through competition. In practice, the market has turned out to be a rather poor mechanism for
ensuring adequate supply and reliable service. In the
market, shortages are supposed to lead to high prices
which, in theory, provide an incentive to build new
plants. But in fact, as we saw in the previous section,
there is more financial reward in creating shortages and
so most companies prefer to avoid risky investments that
will only lower the price by increasing supply.
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In Australia, it has become clear that the electricity
market provides no incentive for generators to invest in
new capacity because undersupply keeps pool prices very
high and the standby plant necessary to ensure system
reliability “erodes generator profit (…) Generator profit is
inversely proportional to the levels of reserve plant with no
incentive for system reliability” (Searle, 2001:24). Also,
existing generators can drop prices when potential competitors are seeking finance for generation facilities. It
would take a brave company indeed to risk investing in
generating infrastructure that may be needed in three or
four years time, but that is how long it takes to get a plant
up and operating. There is now a call for more generating
capacity. The Electricity Supply Association of Australia
estimates that at least AUD 20 billion needs to be invested in fuel supply and generation to meet forecast
demand. The problem is, who will make that investment?
Rather than investing in new infrastructure some of the
private generators are selling up (Thomson, 2002).
In poorer nations, a major argument for privatisation
was to provide foreign capital for much-needed electricity infrastructure. In these countries a lack of capital combined with subsidised electricity for the very poor
ensured that government owned electricity authorities
were debt laden. The new flood of foreign investment,
however, has often not provided the much needed capital
for extra generating capacity. Foreign companies have
bought up existing government facilities at bargain basement prices, put up prices, and then sent their profits
home rather than invest in new generating facilities.
Brazil’s debt has continued to climb along with its
dependence on foreign capital. Foreign investors, who
were happy enough to buy existing plants that had no
remaining debt so that they could make quick returns on
their money, were less interested in investing in new generation capacity, despite the price incentives provided by
the high electricity rates. They demanded that 70 percent
of any new project be financed by the Brazilian
Development Bank; that the price for gas, which they
favoured as a source of electricity, be guaranteed far into
the future with long-term contracts; and that the
Brazilian government take any losses resulting from a fall
in the value of the Brazilian currency against the US dollar (Benjamin, 2001). The remaining state-owned electricity companies had sufficient financial reserves to
undertake the necessary investment, but were not authorised to do so as it would have been contrary to the World
Bank imposed privatisation programme. Other cheaper

in most cases. For example the Electricity Trust of South
Australia (ETSA) contributed some AUD 2 billion dollars to state revenue over the decade before it was privatised (Kelton and Wheatley, 2001). Economist Richard
Blandy later confirmed in 2002 that
Revenues earned by ETSA for the South Australian
government before it was privatised would match, if
not exceed, the interest on South Australian debt
retired as a result of ETSA’s sale. Hence, South
Australians now face historically high electricity prices
compared with the rest of Australia for no net benefit to
the state government finances (Blandy, 2002:11).
Private companies, freed from social obligations, are
able to undertake profitable activities whilst the government continues to pay for unprofitable aspects of electricity supply like environmental protection and equitable access. Previously governments were able to subsidise the unprofitable activities with the profitable ones.
The inability to spread costs across a whole service
means more expense to taxpayers and savings to industry.
When bankruptcies are threatened, governments
have to be prepared to step in and bail out private companies so as to secure the electricity supply. Taxpayers
had to bail out retail electricity companies when wholesale prices went up, as in California, and bail out generating companies when wholesale prices went down, as in
the UK. The British government was unable to stand by
and watch British Energy go bankrupt leaving its eight
nuclear power plants sprinkled around the country-side,
sitting idle with no-one to decommission them. The government therefore ended up committing some GBP 4
billion in 2004 to rescue it.
Taxpayers clearly get the worst of both worlds. They
no longer reap dividends from electricity production
when it is profitable, but they still have to pick up the bill
when it is not. The reason for this is simple to understand: electricity is not a commodity that consumers can
choose to take or leave depending on price and supply; it
is an essential service that is central to the maintenance of
modern lifestyles.

Service and Reliability
And whilst the market is poor at ensuring reserve generating capacity it is even worse at ensuring a modern reli-
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measures such as improving transmission efficiency and
energy conservation were not taken either. The Brazilian
electricity system, which had worked reliably for decades
before privatisation and had been admired and envied
for its plenitude of cheap hydro-electricity, broke down
and Brazil faced such a shortage of electricity that
rationing had to be implemented, causing economic and
social disruption. (For further analysis of recent developments in the power sector in Brazil see Azzi and Berrón’s
chapter in this volume.)
Whilst investment in Latin America has tended to be
a result of full privatisation and mostly involved foreign
acquisitions of government enterprises, investment in
East and South Asia has “focused on introducing independent power producers in markets dominated by vertically integrated, state-owned enterprises” (Izaguirre,
2000:5). IPPs are now a large market in Asia, particularly in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Thailand. In Asia, IPPs generally sell their
electricity to a single state-owned utility according to a
contract called a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). The
rationale for this is that private investment will provide
the capital and expertise needed to increase generating
capacity quickly. However, the amount of money invested is often small compared with the amount of money
paid back by state-owned local utilities, often in foreign
currency, money that then leaves the country. For many
IPP projects, foreign investors only put up, on average, 24
percent of their own money. The rest is obtained through
loans, mostly from foreign banks and agencies. PPAs
have ended up costing governments far more foreign
capital than that originally invested in the electricity
projects (see the chapter by Prayas Energy Group on
India in this volume). IPPs expand capacity at a very high
cost that in fact increases government spending and foreign debt, inhibits competition, blunts technological
innovation and increases consumer costs. They have also
forced governments to bear most of the burden of risk
associated with electricity projects and so “undermined
the very reason for introducing private power in the first
place – to cap public debt and force private power producers to take the financial risks instead of governments”
(Ryder, 2000).
The main political rationale for privatisation in many
developed countries has also been government debt
reduction. The benefits that were supposed to follow
from reduced government budget deficits as the result of
selling electricity systems have turned out to be a mirage

able transmission system. The separation of transmission
and generation and distribution into separate companies
means that the companies making huge profits from generating the electricity don’t have to invest in the infrastructure needed to transmit that electricity to their customers.
Service and reliability have also declined in privatised
electricity systems because the service obligations of government-owned electricity companies are replaced by the
short-term commercial goals of private companies. In
the public service it was not uncommon for employees to
have a strong public service ethos, particularly in the utilities where they “traditionally took pride in their safety
record, in the quality and impartiality of advice offered to
consumers, and in a number of socially responsible activities such as free servicing of old age pensioners’ appliances”
(O’Connell Davidson, 1994:173). This public spiritedness
was lost as employees were forced to take a more commercial view of their work.
Since deregulation in the US has removed the service
obligations from private companies they are able to
increase their profits by cutting maintenance schedules
and staff and neglecting the upgrading of infrastructure.
This is particularly the case for privately-owned transmission companies because it can be cheaper, in the
short-term, to replace equipment after it fails than preempting that failure with a timely replacement. If such
failures result in blackouts then others bear most of the
costs. It might even prompt a government to pay millions
of dollars in subsidies. The lack of investment in transmission infrastructure contributed to the widespread
electricity blackouts in the north-eastern states of the US
and Canada in 2003.
Deregulation has shifted responsibility for investment
that would prevent such failures of the market. But market players are more interested in profitability than providing a reliable service. In the case of electricity transmission the link between profitability and reliable service
provision is so tenuous that the deregulation process has
been more of an act of faith than one grounded in commonsense. The supposed efficiency gains to be made by
private, competitive companies, have been made through
short term cost savings, which include cutting the quality or level of service rather than offering the same level of
service for less money. Sometimes return on investment
has been increased by charging more for the service.
Often cost savings have been made by lowering rates of
pay and conditions for workers and making thousands of

62

public sector workers redundant. Full-time permanent
employment has been increasingly replaced by part-time
and temporary work. In this way private enterprises may
seem to be more efficient but the gains to shareholders
are at the expense of workers and consumers, who suffer
a decline in service levels.
Another easy way to cut costs, although short-sighted, is to cut safety, maintenance, training and research
budgets. Old equipment is not regularly serviced nor
replaced in advance of likely failure. As a result, accidents
and equipment-related blackouts increase as do blackouts related to network congestion because planning and
responsibility for network maintenance and development
is not a market priority.
In Australia alone, employment in the electricity sector fell from about 83,000 in the mid-1990s to 33,000
workers in 2003 (Wilson, 2003). In the US deregulation
has led to a massive reduction of the utility workforce
with 150,000 people losing their jobs, including those
who were responsible for safety and reliability of electricity supplies, as private deregulated utilities shed staff so
as to cut costs. It is estimated by the Utility Workers
Union of America (UWUA) and the US Department of
Energy’s Energy Information Administration (DOE EIA)
that utilities now employ less than two-thirds of the
workers they did in the early 1990s. The UWUA claims
that cost-cutting has led to fewer inspections, deferral of
repairs, and less worker training, all of which threaten
worker and public safety as well as system reliability
(Higley, 2000; Oppenheim, 2001).
In a report prepared for the European Federation of
Public Service Unions, Oppenheim (2001:20) pointed
out:
The industry infrastructure is aging and in need of continuous maintenance… The problems range from poles
that are condemned by workers but not replaced; to
load tap changers that are inoperable, affecting proper
voltage levels; to uninspected transformers that pose a
serious risk of exploding. Field workers across the country observe that cables are tested less frequently; that
substation and manhole inspection cycles are longer;
and that condemned poles are often not replaced. Key
system components will not perform as they were
designed to perform due to age, lack of repair, or both.
A lack of maintenance also contributed to the blackouts in New York City as it did in Chicago, Long Island,

Environmental impacts
Electricity deregulation positively deters investment in
conservation and energy efficiency: “the market competes
for lowest up-front price, not lowest price over the lifetime
of a product (…) In the old electric system, it cost utilities
less to subsidize our more efficient bulbs than to build
another dinosaur plant” (Meadows, 2001). In the deregulated system the incentive is to sell more electricity for
premium prices.
Deregulation allows, and in many instances encourages, the maintenance of old polluting coal-fired power
plants that contribute smog, mercury and particulate
matter to the atmosphere causing thousands of deaths
annually. In Australia, deregulation and privatisation
have led to the increased use of the most polluting type of
coal, brown coal and there has been a 31 percent increase
in greenhouse gases as a result of energy deregulation
(Earth Island Journal, 2001:3). In the US, the Bush
administration has used the problems created by deregulation as an excuse to relax air pollution controls on
power plants. The Commission for Environmental

Cooperation has found that electricity deregulation
caused the energy efficiency budgets of North American
power companies to be cut by 42 percent between 1995
and 1999 (Melnbardis, 2002).
IPPs “skew incentives towards new generation and
against meeting electricity needs through greater efficiency.
In addition, the purchase contracts have forced use of highcost power over lower-cost power already available”
(Dubash, 2002a:19). There is not much likelihood that
electricity suppliers will encourage their customers to use
electricity efficiently if they are committed to purchasing
more electricity than they need from an IPP. Moreover,
the export credit agencies that often fund them usually
do not require the environmental measures and protections that governments require. As a result IPPs have
tended to favour oversized, outdated, polluting fossil
fuel-based power projects.
A study by the World Resources Institute of electricity reforms around the world found that:
Financial concerns and donor conditions have driven
electricity reform. Managed by closed political processes and dominated by technocrats and donor consultants, environmental considerations play almost no role
in a re-envisioned electricity sector. Social concerns are
given more importance, but only to the extent that
reforms affect politically powerful groups (Lash,
2002:7).
When the market decides on the fuel source there is
no incentive to take account of the environmental costs
of that source. As a result, new generating capacity
around the world continues to be dominated by fossil
fuels. In the US the Energy Information Agency predicts
that new power plants will be mainly gas-fired in the
shorter term and increasingly coal-fired in the longer
term as gas prices increase (EIA, 2005). Similarly
Europe’s new power plants are likely to be gas-fired for
the short-term future. Although cleaner than coal, gas
still contributes to global warming and is not renewable.
Worldwide, the use of natural gas and coal surged in 2004
(The Worldwatch Institute, 2005).
The folly of relying on markets for fostering renewable energy has been debunked and many governments
are again resorting to regulations to increase renewable
energy use. In California utilities are now required by the
government to aim to meet 20 percent of their supply
with renewable sources by 2017 and the Californian
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New Jersey, New England, and Texas. For example, a
series of fires in electrical transformers caused power
blackouts in New York City during the summer of 2002.
These were the result of aging equipment unable to keep
up with demand because there was no incentive in the
deregulated system to upgrade equipment and no-one
held responsible when it fails (Blair, 2002).
Fuses and transformers across South Australia also
failed and transmission across high-voltage lines was
deliberately cut off to avoid potential fires on very hot
days. There were 500 outages in January 2001 alone. The
network was outdated and neglected and unions claimed
that the 900 workers employed to check and repair power
lines a decade before had been reduced to about 300,
whilst maintenance crews were reduced from 270 to 90
(Blair, 2002; Higley, 2002).
Blackouts also increase as a result of lower reserve
levels of generation capacity caused by lack of incentives
to invest in reserve generation capacity discussed in the
previous section. A study by the Federal Bank of New
York found that consumers can expect less reliability of
supply: “Market forces may be inadequate to guarantee
that providers can always deliver a sufficient quantity of
electricity to maintain the grid’s stability during peak-load
periods” (quoted in Consumer Reports, 2002:34).

Energy Commission is proposing this be accelerated so
that 20 percent is met by 2010 and 33 percent by 2020
(CEC, 2004).

Corporate Power
Part of the rhetoric of privatisation had been that it
would create new nimble and competitive operators that
would give consumers a new deal. However, in most
countries where the vertically integrated electricity
industry has been unbundled to foster competition,
industry consolidation has resulted in a reintegration of
the sector:
Industry players are racing to create a new group of
vertically and horizontally integrated structures (businesses owning generation or gas wells, and retailing in
different state markets) in an effort to protect themselves from the wild gyrations of the energy markets
and to gain economies of scale (Myer, 2002:3).
Privatisation of services is not only transferring publicly owned assets into private hands but also into the
hands of fewer and fewer companies. The buyers of government assets and services have mainly been large
transnational corporations that, over time, have bought
up or squeezed out their competition. Such consolidation
helps corporations to cut costs and spread expenses but
mainly it is done to increase profits, either by acquiring
rival companies at home and so increasing their market
power or by acquiring overseas corporations that promise high rates of return on investment. This latter
prompted US companies to purchase approximately half
the available power companies in Britain and Australia as
soon as they were privatised (Flowers, 1998).
In Europe today seven electricity transnational corporations dominate. Three of these – Electricité de
France (EdF), E.ON and RWE (both based in Germany)
– control a majority share of generating capacity and
retail sales in most European nations and that share is
growing (Hall, 2005). The concentration of ownership in
electricity worldwide also continues to grow, with the
combined value of electricity and gas cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 2001-2002 alone being US USD 84
billion (ILO, 2003).
In Asia and Australia, transnational corporations
have been withdrawing with those likely to stay on being
European firms – EdF, Tractebel-Suez, International
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Power and CDC – an American firm – AES – and a
Canadian firm –Transalta. Asian-based transnationals
are moving in, including Cheung Kong and China Light
(Hong-Kong based), Singapore Power and YTL
(Malaysia) (Thomas, 2004). In Latin America, dominant
transnationals in the electricity sector include Endesa,
Iberdrola, and Union Fenosa (Spain), EdF and TractebelSuez (France), EdP (Portugal), and AES (US) (Hall,
2004).
Vertically and horizontally integrated companies that
provide full electricity and gas service as well as water
and waste services are emerging. Almost half of the
largest gas and electricity firms undertook ‘convergencerelated’ acquisitions at the end of the nineties. Oil companies such as BP, Shell and Texaco have been acquiring
power companies. The CEO of Edison International has
predicted that within a decade there will be only 10 energy conglomerates worldwide.
Such conglomerates will have even more ability to
manipulate prices and avoid competition, further negating the supposed benefits of deregulation. Concentration
of ownership also undermines the ability of national governments to control foreign owners. Foreign owners can
withhold services for political and economic reasons,
thereby cutting off an essential part of the economic system without governments being able to do anything
about it. For example, US companies shut down the electricity supply in the Dominican Republic to force the
government to pay its debt to them. The big energy corporations “are already exceptionally well placed to operate
jointly or to form a cartel to pressure governments, control
prices and limit competition” (Chavez, 2002:11). Walt
Patterson (1999:84) observed:
Oil multinationals with a wide portfolio of activities in
different parts of the world have never hesitated to suggest that they will withdraw from a particular concession or shut down a particular oilfield if government
policy appears contrary to their interest. Electricity
multinationals with similarly large portfolios will have
a much more potent threat at their disposal.
If privatisation and deregulation are taken to their
logical end, which is the aim of advocates, the public will
be unable to influence the development of essential services, the terms of their provision, the reliability of their
supply, their accessibility or their price. These will all be
decisions made by cartels of transnational corporations

and local governments.
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